Sapir whorf hypothesis

In sociolinguistics, within the linguistic theory, two extreme positions concerning the relationship between language and thought are commonly referred to as mould theories and cloak theories. Mould theories represent language as ‘a mould in terms of that thought categories are cast’.

Mould theories represent language as ‘a mould in terms of that thought categories are cast’.Cloak theories represent the view that ‘language is a cloak conforming to the customary categories of thought of its speakers’. The doctrine that language is the ‘dress of thought’ was fundamental in Neo-Classical literary theory, but was rejected by the Romantics. There is also a related view that language and thought are comparable. According to this stance, thinking is entirely linguistic: there's no ‘non-verbal thought', no ‘translation' at all from thought to language. In this sense, thoughtfully determined by language.

The Sapir-Whorf theory, named after the American linguists Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf, is a mould theory of language. Sapir argued in a classic passage that:

Human beings don't live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular a language that has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language which language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection.

The fact of the matter is that the ‘real world' is to an oversized extent unconsciously built upon the language habits of the group. Not 2 languages are ever sufficiently almost like be thought-about as representing a similar social reality. The worlds during which completely different societies live are distinct worlds, not simply a similar world with different labels attached. We see and hear and otherwise experience very mostly as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain selections of interpretation. In the 1930s this position was extended by his student Whorf who, in another widely cited passage, declared that:

We dissect nature on lines laid down by our native languages. The categories and kinds that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not notice there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds - and this means mostly by the linguistic systems in our minds.

We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and attribute significances as we do, mostly as a result of we are parties to an agreement to organize it in this way an agreement that holds throughout our speech community and is codified within the patterns of our language. The agreement is, of course, an implicit and unstated one, however, its terms are obligatory. We cannot talk at all except by subscribing to the organization and classification of data that the agreement decrees. In its most extreme version, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis can be described as consisting of 2 associated principles.

According to the first, linguistic determinism, our thinking is determined language. According to the second, linguistic relativity, people who speak completely different languages understand and think about the world quite differently. The Whorfian perspective is that translation between one language and another is at the very least problematic, and sometimes not possible. Some commentators additionally apply this to the ‘translation’ of unverbalized thought into language. 

Others recommend that even within a single language any reformulation of words has implications for which means, but subtle. George Steiner has argued that any act of human communication can be seen as involving a kind of translation, so the potential scope of Whorfianism is very broad indeed.

According to the Whorfian stance, ‘content’ is bound up with linguistic ‘form’ and the use of the medium contributes to shaping the meaning. In common usage, we often totally different verbal formulation ‘meaning identical thing’.

In spite of that, for those of a Whorfian persuasion, ‘ it's not possible to mean the same issue in two (or more) different ways’.

Reformulating something transforms the ways in which meanings may be created with it, and during this sense, sort and content are indivisible. From this stance, words aren't simply the ‘dress’ of thought. The Whorfian perspective is in strong distinction to the extreme universalism of those who adopt the cloak theory.

The Neo-Classical idea of language as merely the dress of thought is based on the idea that a similar thought can be expressed in a very in away. Universalists argue that we can say no matter we would like to mention in any language, which no matter we say in one language will always be translated into another. This is the main and the most common refutation of Whorfianism. Most universalists do acknowledge that translation may on occasions involve a particular amount of circumlocution.

Individuals who regard writing as elementary to their sense of personal and professional identity may experience their written style as indivisible from this identity, and insofar as writers are ‘attached to their words’ they may favour a Whorfian perspective. And, it would be hardly surprising if individual stances toward Whorfianism were not influenced by allegiances to Romanticism or Classicism, or toward either the arts or the sciences.

In the context of the written word, the ‘untranslatability’ claim is generally regarded as strongest in the arts and weakest in ease of formal scientific papers. And, within the literary ‘untranslatability’ was favoured by Romantic literary theorists, for whom the connotative, emotional or personal words were crucial.

Whilst few linguists would accept the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis in its ‘strong', extreme or deterministic form, many now accept a weak, more moderate, or limited Whorfianism, namely that the ways in which we see the world may be influenced by the type of language we use. The Moderate Whorfianism differs from extreme Whorfianism in these ways:

1. The emphasis is on the potential for thinking to be ‘influenced’ rather than unavoidably ‘determined’ by language.

2. it's a two-way process, in order that ‘the kind of language we use' is also influenced by the way we see the world'.

3. Any influence is ascribed not to ‘Language' as such of to one language compared with another but to the use within a language of one variety rather than another ( (typically a sociolect the language used primarily by members of a selected social group).

4. Emphasis is given to the social context of language use instead of to strictly linguistic concerns like the social pressure specifically contexts to use language in one way rather than another. 

Some polemicists, of course, still favour the notion of language as a strait-jacket or prison, but there is a broad academic consensus favouring moderate Whorfianism. Any linguistic influence is now generally considered to be related not primarily to the formal systemic structures of a language (langue to use Saussure's term), but to cultural conventions and individual styles of use (or parole).

Meaning does not reside in a text but arises in its interpretation, and interpretation is shaped by socio-cultural contexts. Conventions regarding what is considered appropriate uses of language in particular social contexts exist both in everyday uses of language and in specialist usage as well. In academia, there are general conventions as well as particular Ones in each disciplinary and methodological context In every subculture the dominant conventions regarding appropriate usage tend to exert a conservative influence on the framing of phenomena.

From the media theory perspective, the sociolects of sub-cultures and also the idiolects of individuals represent a subtly selective view of the world: tending to support certain types of observations and interpretations and to restrict others. And this transformative power goes largely unnoticed, retreating to transparency.